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Determinants of Net Interest Margin 
under Regulatory Requirements 
An Econometric Study 
Using data for the period 1995-96 to 1999-2000, this paper seeks to identify the factors 
influencing spreads of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India. Among the explanatory 
variables, we incorporate, in addition to the standard set of variables, regulatory 
requirement variables. Our analysis reveals that (i) size does not necessarily correlate with 
higher spread, and (ii) higher fee income enables banks to tolerate lower spreads. With 
regard to regulatory requirement variables, it is found that (i) capital plays an important 
role in affecting spreads of public sector banks, and (ii) non-performing assets 
is uniformly important across all bank groups in influencing spreads. 
R KANNAN, ADITYA NARAIN, SAIBAL GHOSH 
Introduction 
T he restructuring exercise initiated 
by the authorities in 1991 is widely 
regarded as a watershed in the 
history of the Indian economy. A salient 
aspect of the reforms process has been the 
deregulation of the financial sector, which 
aimed at lowering intermediation costs 
and raising efficiency levels of the banking 
system. For instance, intermediation costs 
of Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs), 
as percentage of total assets, declined from 
2.94 per cent in 1995-96 to 2.49 per cent 
in 1999-2000. A crucial aspect of the in- 
termediation process is the net interest 
margin or NIM (popularly termed as the 
'spread'). Simply defined, the spread is the 
difference between the interest paid out by 
banks on their deposits and the interest 
earned on the loans normalised by the total 
assets: it serves as a key indicator of the 
efficiency of resource intermediation. 
Judged thus, net interest margin is the 
bread and butter of banking. Too large a 
spread in a deregulated environment indi- 
cates the absence of competition within 
the banking system and is perhaps reflec- 
tive of the existence of a certain degree 
of monopoly power on part of the financial 
intermediaries. Therefore, spreads that are 
unduly high can impinge on the saving and 
investment potential of an economy. On 
the other side, too low spreads can affect 
profit margins of banks, putting require- 
ment on their capital base. This, in turn, 
can render them vulnerable to shocks, 
especially in the absence of sufficient 
capital cushion against adverse movements 
in market variables (e g, interest rates). 
Hence, very low interest spreads also augur 
ill for the banking sector. 
Historically, higher spreads have typi- 
cally been associated with less devel- 
oped markets - characterised by high 
operating costs, entry barriers and limited 
competition. Spreads in select countries in 
1997 is given in Table 1. It is observed 
from the table that spreads of banks in 
Asian economies are comparable to those 
elsewhere in the world. An exception 
however is the Latin American countries, 
where banks operate on substantially high 
spreads. 
Without loss of generality, one might 
state that the banking sector in the devel- 
oped economies displays relatively lower 
spreads. Question arises, however, about 
the exact nature of the relationship be- 
tween interest margin and the other vari- 
ables indicative of the health and reach of 
the banking sector. -Several developing 
countries have recently undergone 
liberalisation of their financial sector in 
order to raise financial sector efficiency. 
At the same time, the liberalisation process 
has been accompanied by the introduction 
of prudential regulations designed to safe- 
guard the health of the financial system 
and contain systemic risks. The ushering 
of liberalisation coupled with prudential 
norms introduced in these countries pro- 
vide interesting case studies as to under- 
stand the parameters that have been instru- 
mental in determining spreads. 
In a recent exercise, Barajas et al (1999) 
examined the interest spreads in Columbia 
over a period of about 20 years from 1974 
to 1996, covering both the pre-liberalisation 
period and the post-liberalisation period. 
Their analysis reveals that the liberalisation 
process of 1991 in Columbia left the interest 
spreads in the banking sector largely 
unaltered. In comparison, financial 
liberalisation has resulted in a decrease in 
the spread in the banking systems of 
Portugal, Chile, Turkey, Spain and Argen- 
tina.1 
In the light of the above discussion, the 
present study seeks to examine the rela- 
tionship between the NIM of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks (SCBs)2 and variables 
indicative of the health of banks and the 
nature of their operations in the post 
liberalisation period. To recapitulate a bit, 
deregulation of interest rates were under- 
taken in a phased manner and it was only 
in October 1994 that lending rates were 
completely dismantled.3 The rest of the' 
paper proceeds as follows. In the follow- 
ing section, we study the broad trends in 
the net interest margin of the SCBs in the 
decade of the nineties. Section III explains 
the methodology of the analysis. The model 
framework is discussed in Section IV, 
while Section V is devoted to the empiri- 
cal analysis. The penultimate section 
derives certain policy implications that 
emerge out of the analysis. Concluding 
remarks are gathered in Section VII. 
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II 
Indian Evidence with regard 
to NIMs 
Prior to the liberalisation process, public 
sector banks (PSBs) in particular, enjoyed 
a fair degree of monopoly power in the 
financial market by virtue of their market 
presence as given by their extended reach 
in terms of the number of branches and 
command over deposits. They had a share 
of around 90 per cent of the total business 
(defined as the total of deposits and ad- 
vances) of SCBs in the early nineties, which 
came down to around 80 per cent by the 
end of the nineties. It is therefore, to be 
expected that the interest spread for PSBs 
up to the mid-nineties would have been 
fairly high. However, PSBs in India, unlike 
their counterparts in other developing 
economies, have not shown the expected 
declines in their spreads soon after 
liberalisation. Since the onset of financial 
liberalisation with the submission of the 
first Narasimham Committee Report in 
1991, there has been a marked change in 
bank behaviour. Gone are the days when 
banks operated under administered lend- 
ing and deposit rates, which guaranteed 
them a comfortable spread.4 For instance, 
at the beginning of the decade of the 
nineties, the interest spread of PSBs was 
not exceptionally high. In 1991-92, the 
NIM of PSBs stood at 3.22 percent of total 
assets as compared to 3.31 per cent for all 
SCBs. Among PSBs, the spread for the 
State Bank of India and its seven associates 
(SBI group) was on the higher side at 3.80 
per cent while that for the 19 nationalised 
banks taken together, was only 2.86 per 
cent of their total assets. From the Chart, 
it is clear that the interest spreads of PSBs 
as well as SCBs declined sharply over the 
period 1991-92 to 1993-94 and thereafter 
started picking up slowly. From 1996-97 
onwards, the spreads have tended to de- 
cline. An overview of some of the select 
parameters of SCBs over the last five years 
is presented in Table 2. 
The upward movement in the NIM 
immediately after the liberalisation of 
interest rates might have been reflective 
of a knee-jerk reaction on part of these 
banks to improve their profitability. At the 
same time, the first half of the nineties 
was characterised by a high interest rate 
regime, so much so that lending rates re- 
mained comfortably ahead of deposit rates 
and ensured a steady spread for banks.5 
However, post liberalisation, the gradual 
lowering of pre-emptions, the increasing 
competition within the banking sector, the 
emergence of disintermediation pressures 
from a liberalised financial marketplace, 
the advent of 'virtual' banking, the in- 
creasing product sophistication demanded 
by customers, the growing financial ma- 
turity of the corporate sector, have been, 
in all likelihood, responsible for both the 
decline in margins as well as their progres- 
sive convergence. Almost around the same 
time, capital adequacy requirements have 
been stipulated for banks in line with the 
Basle Accord. With hindsight, one might 
surmise that these measures, to a large 
extent, propelled banks to reconfigure 
their portfolios towards low-risk assets to 
meet the regulatory requirements with a 
concomitant effect on their spreads. 
Table 1: Spreads of Select Economies 
in 1997 
Country Net Interest Margin 
(1) (2) 
Asia 
India 0.03 
Pakistan 0.035 
Indonesia 0.04 
Singapore 0.02 
Japan 0.02 
Europe 
France 0.03 
Germany 0.02 
UK 0.02 
Latin America 
Argentina 0.07 
Brazil 0.11 
Mexico 0.05 
Venezuela 0.09 
North America 
US 0.04 
Canada 0.02 
Ill 
Methodology of the Analysis 
There are in fact very few studies on the 
determinants of NIM. In a recent study, 
Kannan et al (2001) studied the determi- 
nants of net interest margins of PSBs for 
the period 1995-96 to 1999-00 for sche- 
duled commercial banks and found, among 
others, non-performing loans to be a cru- 
cial factor influencing spread. The study 
however is for SCBs (except RRBs) as a 
whole and does not consider the impact 
of regulatory requirements on different 
bank groups and this, in a way, limits the 
empirical appeal of the model. At a time, 
when the banking sector has been adapting 
itself to the international norms, such forces 
are likely to impinge spreads of various 
bank-groups in different ways. We, there- 
fore, modify the earlier framework in order 
to examine the factors affecting the NIM 
of SCBs, post interest rate deregulation. 
In our view, the entire gamut of SCBs 
provides a fairly comprehensive frame- 
work to capture the effects of different 
variables affecting their margins. Based on 
availability of data for the period 1995-96 
to 1999-2000, the analysis covers 86 banks 
comprising of 27 public sector banks, 31 
private sector banks and 28 foreign banks. 
This provides a rich set of banks with 
sufficient heterogeneity in operations to 
enable one to decipher, with a reasonable 
degree of confidence, as to what factors 
might have effected spreads of SCBs.6 
Towards achieving this objective, it is 
important that an analytical framework 
Table 2: Select Variables for Scheduled Commercial Banks, 1995-96 to 1999-00 
(as per cent of total assets) 
YearNariable Net Profit Interest Other Interest Spread Intermediation 
Income Income Expended Cost 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1995-96 0.16 9.36 1.50 6.23 3.13 2.94 
1996-97 0.67 9.88 1.45 6.66 3.22 2.85 
1997-98 0.82 9.27 1.52 6.32 2.95 2.63 
1998-99 0.47 9.18 1.34 6.41 2.78 2.67 
1999-2000 0.66 8.96 1.43 6.24 2.72 2.49 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Scheduled Commercial Banks: 1995-96 to 1999-00 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Public (27) Private (31) Foreign (28) Public (27) Private (31) Foreign (28) 
Old New Old New 
SPREAD 2.98 2.80 2.56 3.76 0.69 0.79 0.74 1.89 
SIZE 9.7 7.36 8.36 6.69 0.84 1.07 0.44 1.55 
FEE 1.27 1.63 1.48 2.60 0.89 1.88 0.55 2.90 
INDEX 0.003 0.0002 0.0006 0.0018 0.005 0.0005 0.0007 0.004 
Figures in brackets indicate number of banks in that category. 
SPREAD is the net interest margin to total assets. SIZE is the log of total assets. FEE is the ratio of non- 
interest income to total assets. INDEX is the proxy for market power 
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that can characterise all risk factors and 
bank-specific behaviour be posited. Within 
the framework, the bank is said to behave 
like a risk-averse dealer in mobilising and 
deploying deposit resources. The bank will 
engage in arbitrage between deposit and 
lending rates up to a point depending on 
its degree of risk aversion. The second 
justification for risk aversion is that "it 
ensures a finite bank size, as well as the 
existence of riskless investments in money 
market instruments. Without risk aversion, 
there is no limit to the extent that banks 
may engage in arbitrage. Banks will ex- 
pand ad infinitum until the margin is 
completely eliminated" [Angbazo 1997, 
Allen 1988]. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we use 
time-series cross-section data (or pooled 
data) estimation procedure. Pooled data 
models presuppose the fact that differ- 
ences across units can be captured in 
differences in constant term (as in fixed 
effects models) or alternately, individual 
specific constant terms are randomly dis- 
tributed across cross-sectional units (as in 
random effects models) [Judge et al 1994]. 
Formally, the model is written as 
Yit = ii+P' xit+Eit fixed effects model 
Yit=a .+'' xi t+Eit random effects model (1) 
In the above formulations, yit and xit are 
the tth observation for the ith unit and ?it 
is the associated vector of disturbances, P 
is the vector of explanatory variables and 
i is an identity matrix. The difference 
between the two sets of models lies in the 
component ui. This component reflects the 
random disturbance characterising the i th 
observation and is constant through time. 
It is furthermore assumed that 
E(?it)=E(ui)=O 0; E(it2) = a2; E()= 
E(Eit Ui)=0 for all i, t and j; E(EitEjS)=O if 
t ? s or i ? j; and E(ui uj)=0 if i j. 
The model is then estimated using 
Generalised Least Square (GLS) approach. 
If the interest lies in with the FEM, then 
one can test the null hypothesis that the 
constant erms are all equal with an F-test. 
Under the null hypothesis, the efficient 
estimator is pooled least square. The 
F-ratio used for the test is 
F(n-l, nT-n-K) 
=[Ru2-Rp2)/(n-l)]/[l-Ru2)/(nT-n-K)] (2) 
where u indicates the unrestricted model 
and p indicates the pooled model (with 
only a single overall constant term). 
For the random effects model, one can 
use the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test. 
Chart : Spreads of Various Bank Groups: 1991-92 to 1999-00 
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Ho2:u2 = 0 vs Ho:(o2 ? 0 
the test statistics is 
LM = [nT/2(T-I)][Xi (E eit)2 / 
it 
Given that the data set exhausts the 
population of SCBs, there is a priori support 
for the hypothesis that bankwise variances 
in performance emanates from divergences 
in initial conditions, e g, scale of opera- 
tions; in other words, there are bank-spe- 
cific constants. This tilts the choice of 
model in favour of 'fixed effects' estima- 
tors. However, there is no a priori reason 
to assume correlation between regressors 
and errors; consequently, panel regressions 
were also estimated for 'random effects' 
model. In order to make a choice between 
the two sets of models, a Hausman test for 
choice of one vis-a-vis the other was 
conducted under the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between regressors and errors. 
The significance of the Chi-Square (X2) 
statistic of the Hausman test enables re- 
jection of the variable effects model under 
all cases. 
IV 
The Model Framework 
The representative bank is modelled as 
a dealer in deposit mobilisation and de- 
ployment of the mobilised resource for a 
net interest margin, which includes com- 
pensation for risks and other influencing 
factors. Assuming that the money market 
risk-free rate of interest R captures both 
the true opportunity cost of capital and the 
true time preference of the savers, the price 
of loan will be interest rate plus a service 
fee a, so that Pl=R+a. The price of 
deposits will be equal to the expected 
money market risk-free rate of interest R 
minus a fee for servicing deposits, b, so 
that Pd=R-b. Thus, the interest spread 
becomes, 
PrPd=[R+a)-(R-p)]=(x+P (4) 
If the planning horizon is unitary, the 
loan and deposit rates are given. But risk 
averse banks face un-synchronised arrival 
of demand for loans and supply of deposits 
to "select the optimal loan and deposit rate 
which minimises the risks of excessive 
demand for (risky) loans and insufficient 
supply of deposits" [Angbazo 1997]. In 
other words, the objective is to select 'a' 
and 'b', so as to maximise the net change 
in the terminal value of the bank subject 
to these unsynchronised transactions. The 
resulting model makes the optimal spread 
depend on several market forces and bank- 
specific features [Ho and Saunders 1981]. 
The independent variables chosen for 
the purpose are bank size (SIZE), non- 
interest income as a share of total assets 
(FEE), an index of market power of each 
bank for each year (INDEX) and an index 
of banking service (SERVICE). At the 
same time, given that the bank has to 
comply with various regulatory stipula- 
tions, we use two indices of regulatory 
requirement, as discussed below. 
The specification of the model can there- 
fore is given as 
SPREAD = f [SIZE, FEE, INDEX, 
SERVICE, CARH, CARL, NPAH, NPAL] 
V 
Empirical Specification 
of the Variables 
The dependent variable is the SPREAD. 
The spread is measured as the difference 
between the interest revenue on bank assets 
and interest expense on its liabilities as a 
proportion of total bank assets.7 
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International experiences reveal that 
spreads vary positively with bank size 
(SIZE), when SIZE is proxied by log of 
total assets. The large variation in bank 
size captures the accounting influence of 
size. Smaller banks may have the advantages 
of smaller base and larger margins. But 
though foreign banks are relatively small, 
their home country compulsions might 
drive them into a positive relation between 
size and margin. Therefore, the relation- 
ship between spread and the logarithm of 
total assets is expected to be positive. 
Interest spreads tend to be affected by 
the amount of non-interest income being 
earned by a bank. We consider the ratio 
of Non-interest Income to Total Assets 
(FEE). A higher level of non-interest in- 
come enables the bank to tolerate a lower 
spread and so the relation is expected to 
be negative. 
The increasing competitiveness of fi- 
nancial markets reflected in, for instance, 
the deregulation of interest rates, the 
emergence of several other types of bank 
and non-bank financial intermediaries, the 
emergence of disintermediation pressures 
have resulted in a gradual thinning of 
spreads. To capture the power of a bank 
within the market we define an index of 
market power. The index (INDEX) is 
defined as 
B2l SOBS 
INDEN =b, Ni, +(1-b,) N ' 
BiJ OBS 
i=1 i =1 
t=1,2,... 
T 
t=1,2 ...T 
This index is a weighted average of the 
presence of a bank in business (deposit 
plus advances) and off-balance sheet (OBS) 
activity, the weights being measured in 
terms of the number of branches of bank 
i at time t. In other words, the index 
normalises the number of branches of a 
bank to unity and estimates the relative 
importance of balance sheet (deposits plus 
advances) and off-balance sheet activity of 
the bank in the branch. So if a bank has 
a large branch network (so that, brit is 
high) and the bank commands a large 
business as well (B is large), the first term 
on the RHS will be high, so that the INDEX 
will be high. This will, more often than 
not, be the case with public sector banks. 
On the other hand, for banks with low 
branch network and high off-balance sheet 
activity, the second term on the RHS will 
be relatively higher vis-a-vis the first, 
indicating greater presence of the bank in 
OBS. Greater market presence, as cap- 
tured by INDEX, is likely to enhance bank's 
NIM and so this relation could be positive. 
We also provide an index of banking 
service (SERVICE) defined as the sum of 
per capita number of commercial bank 
offices and per capita number of commer- 
cial bank employees. Such a definition of 
banking service has been used in the lit- 
erature of late [Sarr 2000]. In the Indian 
context, however, such a definition might 
be of little relevance, given the uneven 
concentration of different bank groups in 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. 
For purposes of analysis, we also use an 
alternative definition (CONS), as the sum 
of Other Fixed Assets (OFA) per bank 
office to Fixed Assets (FA) per bank office 
plus Repairs and Maintenance (R and M) 
plus Insurance (I) per bank office to total 
Non-Wage Expenses (NWE) per bank 
office.8 Economically, CONS attempts to 
capture the service improvement, as re- 
flected in banks expenditure on technol- 
ogy and generating greater customer friend- 
liness, proxied by their expenses on other 
fixed assets and repairs and insurance com- 
ponents. Intuitively, enhancements in cus- 
tomer friendliness, as proxied by CONS 
would enable the bank to tolerate a lower 
spread, and so the relationship could be 
negative. 
Of crucial importance from the point of 
view of the present exercise are the regu- 
latory requirement variables. In particular, 
the study focuses on the response of banks 
to the 8 per cent risk-based capital stan- 
dards.9 Here CARH and CARL signal the 
degree of regulatory requirement brought 
about by the risk-based capital standards 
on bank capital ratio. Specifically, the 
regulatory requirement variable equals the 
difference between the inverse of the bank's 
actual risk-based capital ratio (RBC.) and 
the inverse of the regulatory minimum 
risk-based ratio of 8 per cent. Because 
banks with total risk-based capital ratios 
above and below the 8 per cent regulatory 
minimum may react differently, this study 
partitioned regulatory requirement into two 
variables: CARH and CARL.10 CARL 
equals (1/RBC.-1/8) for all banks with a 
total risk-basedcapital ratio less than 8 per 
cent, and zero otherwise.11 Therefore, 
CARL should positively affect spread, as 
these banks will seek a larger margin to 
meet the capital adequacy standards. Simi- 
larly, adequately capitalised banks (CRAR 
at least equal to prescribed minimum) 
would also seek a higher spread in order 
to maintain their margins. So CARH would 
be expected to have a positive effect on 
spreads. In case of a foreign bank, the 
capital requirement is met by the parent 
bank itself, which generally has a good 
standing in the home country and has the 
consent of the authority to apply for a 
banking licence as a branch in India.12 
Regulatory requirement- with respect to 
capital might be of limited relevance for 
this bank group. 
The second set of regulatory require- 
ment variables is defined with regard to 
non-performing assets (NPAs).' The Dis- 
cussion Paper of the Reserve Bank on 
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) has es- 
tablished as one of the trigger points a net 
NPA to net advances (net NPA ratio) of 
10 per cent for initiating regulatory action. 
In line with the above, we define our 
regulatory requirement for NPA with re- 
spect to this 10 per cent benchmark. 
Accordingly, 
NPAL=(1/NPAj-1/10) for all banks 
with a Net NPA ratio < 10 per cent, = 0, 
otherwise. 
NPAH = (1/10-1/NPAp) for all banks 
with a Net NPA ratio > 10 per cent, = 0, 
otherwise. 
In other words, NPAL defines the regu- 
latory requirement for banks with net NPA 
ratio below 10 per cent, whereas NPAH 
is the regulatory requirement for banks 
with net NPA ratio above 10 per cent. 
Clearly, banks in the latter category would 
be under considerable pressure to lower 
Table 4: Matrix of Correlation 
Coefficients 
SPF3EAD SIZE FEE INDEX SERVICE 
SPREAD 1.00 
SIZE -0.20 1.00 
FEE -0.09 -0.31 1.00 
INDEX 0.03 0.48 0.03 1.00 
SERVICE -0.07 0.55 -0.09 0.65 1.00 
Table 5: Summary Results for Pooled 
Data Model - All Banks 
Dependent Variable: SPREAD 
Variable Value 
.(1) (2) (3) 
SIZE 
-1.19(0.14)* -1.19(0.14)* 
FEE -0.22 (0.04)* -0.22 (0.04)* 
INDEX 2.71 (33.16) 3.33(32.36) 
SERVICE 6.62 (7.32) -0.02 (0.007)** 
CARTH 0.61 (0.89) 0.68(0.70) 
CARL 0.61 (0.89) 0.003(0.008) 
NPAL 
-0.009(0.02)* -0.009 (0.002)* 
NPAH 
-12.86(5.33)* -13.15(5.16)* 
Hausman Test Ho: 
RE versus FE - x2 (8) 50.63 50.26 
R2 0.64 0.65 
No of observations 430 430 
Note: Figures in brackets indicate standard errors 
*significant at 1 per cent ** significant at 5 per cent 
# significant at 10 per cent 
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their NPA ratios to a reasonable level, so 
that these banks might reconfigure their 
asset portfolios away from loans and to- 
wards low-risk investments, negatively 
impacting their spreads in the process. On 
the other hand, banks with net NPA ratio 
below the 10 per cent benchmark might 
also be expected to exert caution in their 
advance portfolio, tolerating lower spreads 
in the process. Therefore, the sign of the 
coefficient in both cases could be negative. 
Before embarking on a formal analysis, 
we present some clinical tests of the data 
in order to understand the relationship 
among the variables. In Table 3, we present 
the mean and standard deviation (SD) of 
the important variables under consider- 
ation for the different bank groups while 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix. 
Several broad characteristics about the 
different bank groups are discernible from 
Table 3. First, on average, spreads tend to 
be highest for foreign banks and there- 
after for PSBs. Spreads of private sector 
banks tend to be the lowest, on average. 
Secondly, in terms of size, PSBs far out- 
weigh their private sector or foreign coun- 
terparts. Thirdly, foreign banks far outpace 
the public sector or, for that matter, the 
private sector banks in terms of fee in- 
comes. Finally, the index of market power 
is the highest for PSBs and the lowest for 
private sector banks; foreign banks lie in 
between these two bank groups. 
Having conducted these clinical tests, 
we proceed to conduct our empirical 
analysis on the lines delineated above. The 
result of the empirical estimation of the 
pooled data model is presented in Table 5. 
As the results of column (2) of the Table 
reveals, SIZE does not necessarily imply 
higher spreads. This runs contrary to per- 
ceived studies for other countries that find 
SIZE to be positively related to spread 
[Bajaras et al 1998]. Secondly, fee income 
(FEE), not surprisingly, enables banks to 
tolerate a lower spread. The index of market 
power (INDEX) and SERVICE variables 
have the expected signs; they are, how- 
ever, insignificant at conventional levels. 
As regards regulatory requirement, the 
capital adequacy variable is insignificant 
for banks, which have capital levels below 
and above the prescribed stipulation. For 
NPA, on the other hand, both banks with 
NPA ratios below and above the 10 per 
cent benchmark experience lower spreads; 
the decrease is higher for banks with high 
NPA (NPAH) vis-a-vis those with low 
NPA (NPAL). 
The analysis is then conducted sepa- 
rately for the four groups of banks (public 
sector, private sector - old and new and 
foreign banks). The results of the analysis 
are presented in Table 6. The analysis in 
column (2) is based on PSBs. In addition 
to the set of variables referred to above, 
in case of PSBs, we also include a dummy 
variable for autonomy (AUTON), indicat- 
ing which banks were eligible for autonomy 
in a particular year.13 The results throw up 
some interesting conclusions. First, in 
addition to SIZE and FEE, the index of 
market power (INDEX) is statistically 
significant for PSBs. This lends support 
to the belief that increased market power 
of PSBs has been instrumental in preserv- 
ing their spreads. With regard to the regu- 
latory requirement variable on capital, the 
analysis reveals banks with CRAR above 
the prescribed level have witnessed a higher 
increase in spread (which is statistically 
significant) vis-a-vis those below the 
threshold (which is statistically insignifi- 
cant). With regard to NPA ratio, PSBs with 
high net NPA ratio (NPAH) witnessed a 
greater decline in spread vis-a-vis those 
with low net NPA ratio (NPAL) and this 
result was uniformly valid across all bank 
groups. The Net NPA ratio therefore turns 
out to be a critical factor influencing spreads 
of various bank groups, especially those 
with high NPA. The autonomy variable 
however does not seem to have been 
effective in influencing spreads of PSBs. 
Column 3 focuses on old private sector 
bans. As with PSBs, both the SIZE and 
FEE variables are significant at conven- 
tional levels. Among others, banks with 
high NPAs posted a much higher decline 
in spread as compared with those with 
relatively low NPAs. This might be sug- 
gestive of an element of 'loan conserva- 
tism' on the part of banks with relatively 
poor asset quality, which adversely im- 
pacted their spreads. As regards new pri- 
vate sector banks (column 4), the SER- 
VICE variable was found to be statistically 
significant; better service enabled foreign 
banks to garner higher spreads. This in- 
dicates relatively greater service conscious- 
ness on the part of these banks vis-a-vis 
their public sector counterparts. The SER- 
VICE variable is significant for foreign 
banks as well, in addition to SIZE and FEE, 
as adhered to above. 
As an additional exercise, a similar 
analysis was conducted on the lines de- 
scribed above, with CONS as the alterna- 
tive explanatory variable (instead of SER- 
VICE). The third column of Table 5 pre- 
sents the results for SCBs. Evidently, in 
addition to the significance of the vari- 
ables adhered to above, the CONS variable 
is significant at conventional levels, sug- 
gesting that expenditure on enhancing 
customer service as proxied by CONS, 
performs relatively better vis-a-vis the 
SERVICE indicator. The explanatory 
power of the results is broadly similar to 
the earlier analysis. The bank groupwise 
exposition, presented in Table 7 corrobo- 
rates our findings as regards the coefficient 
on CONS. The coefficient is significant 
for new private sector and foreign banks, 
while the INDEX coefficient remains sig- 
nificant for public sector banks alone. 
Among others, public and foreign banks 
with high NPA experience larger decrease 
in spreads in contrast to foreign banks. 
An interesting aspect that emerges from 
Tables 6 and 7 is that both private and 
foreign banks are relatively immune to the 
regulatory requirement on capital. This is 
not surprising, since foreign banks and 
Table 6: Summary Results for Pooled Data Model according to Bank Group 
Dependent Variable: SPREAD 
Variable Bank Group 
Public Sector Banks Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks 
Old New 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIZE -0.88 (0.15)* -1.31 (0.15)* -1.26 (0.22)* -0.75 (0.43)# 
FEE -0.21 (0.05)* -0.15 (0.03)* -0.09 (0.04)* -0.27 (0.09)* 
INDEX 24.43 (14.68)# -19.31 (17.01) -47.57 (58.99) 0.88 (7.04) 
SERVICE 4.32 (20.57) 2.03 (7.58) 7.27 (3.34)* 9.65 (3.21)* 
CARH 0.60 (0.24)* 1.99 (2.71) 7.46 (3.67)** 19.55(36.18) 
CARL -0.52 (0.33) -0.003 (0.004) -0.68 (0.37)# -32.19 (33.07) 
NPAL 
-0.37(0.78) 0.28 (0.29) 2.10(1.18)# -0.009 (0.004)# 
NPAH -18.79 (3.82)* -9.74 (5.39)# -7.68(13.24) -13.30(11.32) 
AUTON -0.01 (0.07) -- -- -- 
Hausman Test Ho: RE vs FE X2 (9)=28.89 X2(8)=47.91 X2(8)=8.97 X2(8)=8.97 
R2 0.91 0.81 0.87 0.55 
No of observations 135 115 40 140 
Note: Figures in brackets indicate standard errors. 
*significant at 1 per cent ** significant at 5 per cent # significant at 10 per cent. 
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new private sector banks have perforce to 
meet the CRAR requirements in order to 
conduct banking business in India. An 
exception is, however, the new private 
sector banks, especially those which are 
adequately capitalised. These banks ex- 
perienced a significant increase in spreads, 
indicative of perhaps their prudent lending 
policies and relatively lower NPAs. The 
coefficient is also significant only in case 
of adequately capitalised PSBs, being 
perhaps suggestive of the fact that these 
banks were making pro-active efforts to 
raise their spreads via lending. 
VI 
Policy Implications 
Several broad policy implications can be 
derived from the analysis. First, most 
analysis of interest spread determination, 
especially for developed countries, assume 
a standard set of variables that commonly 
affectnet interest margins. Such analyses, 
however, need to be appropriately modi- 
fied, if applied to developing country 
markets. For one, financial markets in 
developing countries are relatively less 
perfect vis-a-vis developed ones: informa- 
tional asymmetry is often quite pervasive 
and regulatory and accounting norms might 
be in a state of evolution. In the light of 
these differences, it is important that such 
factors are taken into account while under- 
standing the determinants of micro 
behaviour of banks. Banks, in general, and 
public sector banks, in particular, would 
need to factor such regulatory require- 
ments into account before analysing their 
spreads. Secondly, the evidence in the 
Indian context reveals that SIZE does not 
necessarily imply higher spreads. In other 
words, bigger banks do not give rise to 
higher spreads. This assumes importance 
in the present scenario, wherein a spate of 
mergers and acquisitions have been ongo- 
ing in the Indian banking sector. Thirdly, 
diversification by banks is important in 
order to garner higher spreads. In other 
words, higher fee income is a crucial 
component of generating or even sustain- 
ing higher spreads on the part of banks. 
Diversification into fee-based activity has 
the added advantage of not being subject 
to prudential norms, which testifies the 
first point made above. Fourthly, the 
AUTONOMY variable is insignificant for 
public sector banks. This supports a recent 
study by Sarker et al (1998) which found 
that, in the absence of well functioning 
capital markets, there might not be signifi- 
cant differences in the performance of 
public and private enterprises. One would 
need to go beyond the simple AUTO- 
NOMY measure and address issues of 
ownership in this regard. Finally, our 
analysis supports the Prompt Corrective 
Action Standards in the Indian context. Put 
differently, banks with high net NPA ratio 
might witness a further deterioration in 
their balance sheets. In view of the above, 
early stage recognition of their problems 
might enable the supervisory authorities to 
initiate corrective action to pro-actively 
address the weaknesses. 
VII 
Concluding Remarks 
While appreciating the various policy 
implications, as explained above, one has 
to equally recognise the limitations of the 
analysis. The SCBs have to meet various 
targeted credit requirements like loans to 
priority sectors, export credit, etc. These 
have not been taken into consideration. 
Secondly, the structure of the banking 
industry determines the interactions and 
the cross-effects among various determi- 
nants of spread, which cannot be easily 
captured by this framework. Thirdly, a 
bank's attitude towards risk varies from 
risk-averse to risk loving via the risk- 
neutrality depending on the risk appetite 
of the management. Finally, the regulatory 
requirement variable was defined with 
respect to prescribed stipulation on CRAR 
and some benchmark level of net NPA 
ratio. With regard to CRAR, in particular, 
more often than not, it is peer requirement 
that serves as a trigger to maintain desired 
levels of capital. The CARH and CARL 
variables would then need to be redefined to 
incorporate regulatory requirement among 
similar banks (e g, based on comparable 
asset size). Such an analysis would provide 
a far richer dynamics regarding the inter- 
mediation process of banks under various 
regulatory constraints. These remain part 
of the future research agenda. [ 
Data Source 
I Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 
1998-99. 
2 Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in 
Inidia (various years). 
3 Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India 
(various years). 
Table 7: Summary Results for Pooled Data Model according to Bank Group 
Dependent Variable: SPREAD 
Variable Bank Group 
Public Sector Banks Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks 
Old New 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIZE -0.90 (0.16)* -1.26 (0.15)* -0.96 (0.26)* -0.77 (0.43)** 
FEE -0.22 (0.05)* -0.14 (0.03)* -0.09 (0.03)* -0.27 (0.09)* 
INDEX -25.21 (14.16)# -18.23(17.13) -6.83 (6.02) -7.20 (77.25) 
CONS 0.37 (0.31) 0.15 (0.12) 0.54 (0.28)# -0.02 (0.012)# 
CARH 0.27 (0.21) 2.16 (2.73) 7.09 (3.60)# 13.55 (9.31) 
CARL -0.05 (0.38) -0.004 (0.05) -0.59 (0.36) -7.58 (11.31) 
NPAL -0.29 (0.78) 0.26 (0.28) 1.70 (1.13) -0.01 (0.004)* 
NPAH -19.29 (3.95)* -9.43 (5.42)# -0.27 (13.77) -11.59(11.01) 
AUTON 0.01 (0.07) -- -- -- 
Hausman Test Ho: RE vs FE X2(9)=36.33 x2(8)=46.19 X2(7)=10.78 X2(8)=9.91 
R2 0.90 0.81 0.87 0.54 
No of observations 135 115 40 140 
Note: Figures in brackets indicate standard errors. 
*significant at 1 per cent ** significant at 5 per cent # significant at 10 per cent. 
Notes 
[The views expressed in the paper are the personal 
views of authors. ] 
1 For experience in the developed countries, see, 
for instance, Williams (1998). 
2 Scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) refer to 
the combination of public sector banks, private 
sector banks and foreign banks. Regional rural 
banks, which also form part of the SCBs, are 
not considered for the present analysis. 
3 Banks are allowed to fix interest rates on all 
term-deposits of more than 15 days maturity. 
Likewise, on the deposit side, the only 
administered interest rate on rupee rate deposits 
is the savings bank deposits, currently fixed 
at 4 per cent. 
4 At present, the only administered rate is the 
savings bank deposit rate, fixed at 4 per cent. 
5 For instance, the deposit rate on 1-3 years 
maturity was 12 per cent in 1991-92, while 
the lending rate of the comparable period was. 
19 per cent. By 1996-97, while the deposit rate 
had come down to 11-)2 per cent, the lending 
rate of 5 major public sector banks had declined 
to 14-15 per cent. By 1998-99, these rates had 
declined even further to 9-11 per cent and 12- 
13 per cent, respectively. 
6 The following mergers have taken place in the 
banking sector during 1999-2000. The Bareilly 
Corporation Bank was amalgamated with Bank 
of Baroda with effect from June 3, 1999. The 
Sikkim Bank was amalgamated with Union 
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Bank of India with effect from December 22, 
1999. The Times Bank was amalgamated 
voluntarily with HDFC Bank with effect from 
February 26,2000. The branches of the British 
Bank of the Middle East in India were 
amalgamated with HSBC with effect from 
September 25, 1999. 
7 Strictly speaking, the denominator should be 
total earning assets (in contrast to total assets), 
but data constraints prevent us from taking 
this into consideration. 
8 CONS [ OFA / bank office + 
FA /I bank office 
(R & M plus I)/bank office 
NWE /.bank office 
9 As on March 31, 1997 and 1998, SCBs had 
to comply with a CRAR of 8 per cent. This 
ratio has been raised to 9 per cent effective 
March 31, 2000. 
10 CARL refers to banks with low CAR (below 
the prescribed minimum). Reverse is the case 
for CARH. A similar logic applies to the 
notations NPAL and NPAH. 
11 For the year 2000, the CRAR has been taken 
at 9 per cent. 
12 Total capital requirement for entry for a foreign 
bank is presently US $25 million, of which 
US $ 10 million of assigned capital needs to 
be brought in prior to opening of the first 
branch (the principal office), a further US $ 
10 million at the time of opening the second 
branch and a further US $ 5 million at the time 
of opening the third branch. No further capital 
requirements are imposed for opening of more 
branches. The capital needs to be brought into 
the country before the start of banking 
operations. 
13 The autonomy granted by the government to 
the public sector banks is subject to fulfilling 
the following criteria: (i) Positive net profits 
for the last three years, (ii) Capital Adequacy 
Ratio not below the prescribed minimum, 
(iii) Net NPA ratio below 9 per cent of net 
advances, and (iv) Minimum Net Owned Funds 
of Rs100 crore. 
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